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Recently published research that attempts to explain the Great Divergence
mainly focuses on geography, technological progress, and international trade.
However, we do not believe these are its only | or even the most basic |
causes. Instead, we submit that the `social culture' of a country or a region is
the most fundamental reason and incorporates these other causes, thereby pro-
viding a reasonable unied explanation. This paper is mainly based on a very
simple two-sector benchmark model that simulates the economic characteris-
tics of England and the Yangzi Delta of China during 1400-1850. It explores
aspects of this transition period, and obtains many meaningful results that are
consistent with Unied Growth theory, which is usually based on very complex
models.
Key Words: The industrial revolution; The great divergence; Dierence of cul-
ture and systems.
JEL Classi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1. INTRODUCTION
In the long history of human development, the world's production and
population increased very gradually prior to the nineteenth century. Fur-
ther, the dierences in living standards between countries were very small.
However, from 1900 on, the story was dierent. In some countries, both
population and production began exploding in a way that had never be-
fore been seen in human history. At the same time, the ratio of the GDP
per capita between the richest and poorest regions of the world widened
considerably from a modest value of 3:1 in 1820 to a value of 18:1 in 2001
(Maddison, 2001). There are two aspects about this economic phenomenon
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of the last two centuries that have been widely discussed by economists:
the Modern Growth (the departure from Malthusian constraints) and the
Great Divergence (mainly between Western and Eastern economies). Why?
What is the cause for them?
Myriad papers have focused on these questions, and star-studded causes
have been espoused for a long time. However, this problem has recently
become a hot topic again, and a new development in growth theory |
the Unied Growth theory |is underway. The Unied Growth theory
[Galor and Weil (2000), Howitt (2000), Jones (2001), Galor and Moav
(2002), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Lucas (2002), etc.] aims to oer a
systematic explanation for the Modern Growth and Great Divergence by
employing one unied economic model. While extant research in this eld,
taken as a whole, mainly focuses on ve causes, viz., geography, human
capital, technology progress, cultural institutions, and international trade,
each study usually stresses only a single cause. Thus, our questions are as
follows. Which of the causes should be the most important one, if there be
one such cause? How do the causes work in conjunction with each other?
What kind relationship should be among them? A further question that
is based on these problems is: Could we develop a really unied model
to explain the Modern Economic Growth and the Great Divergence by
combining all these most important causes into a systematically developed
framework?
On the basis of the above problems, we are planning to study the Great
Divergence problem through a modeling approach. Even though some
scholars emphasize that models are, after all, only models that can be
greatly at odds with reality, many modeling-oriented papers are regarded
as having made a great contribution to both economic theory development
and a real understanding of problems. We do believe models are the most
basic and helpful tools for understanding a supposed case of the develop-
ment of economic history. Since we have no data on a supposed case of
history, any approach that is based on historical data might commit an er-
ror of logic, namely, the application of real historical data in the analysis of
a supposed case. Thus, a modeling approach might be the only reasonable
alternative for studying a supposed case.
This paper aims to study rstly the fundamental reason for the Diver-
gence and secondly whether an Industrial Revolution could have arisen
in the Yangzi Delta in China rather than in England during its actual
period of occurrence. With regard to the former question, many have
stressed the contribution of technological progress and human capital ac-
cumulation. For example, Galor and Weil (2000) discuss technology and
population, while Lucas (2002) addresses human capital. In the context of
other factors, Galor and Moav (2002) analyze the eect of trade, Howitt
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ideas, Powelon (2005)1 stresses the eect of institutions, etc. The second
question has been discussed by Pomeranz (2001) in his well-known study,
The Great Divergence, where he suggests that external conditions, such
as the exploitation of the New World, had been a major contributor to
the Divergence between England and the Yangzi Delta. Without favorable
outside conditions, England might have not distinguished itself as the rst
industrialized country. In a more recent work, Voigtlander and Voth (2006)
argue that it is reasonable for England to have been the rst to transition
from a Malthusian state to that of modern growth because England had
better initial conditions (i.e., it was richer and better urbanized) than Chi-
na. In this paper, by modeling the contemporary economic characteristics
of Britain and China's Yangzi Delta during 1400-1850, we conclude that
dierences in the social culture between Britain and China during that
time underlay | and were sucient to cause | the initial dierences in
both living standards and urbanized levels, as stressed by Voigtlander and
Voth. In turn, these dierences resulted in further gaps in physical capital
accumulation, human capital accumulation, technology progress, and nal-
ly, the Great Divergence. We also claim that even with the resources and
markets of the New World, due to China's particular culture, it would still
have been impossible for China to develop an Industrial Revolution earlier
than England. This point is consistent with that of Voigtlander and Voth
(2006).
To avoid the proverbial fallacy of the blind men and the elephant, we s-
tudy the combined eects of multiple factors in one unied model. That is,
the contributions of four factors, namely, the reformation of the social cul-
ture, exploitation of the New World, expansion of trade, and development
of technology, are unied to form a systematic description of the evolution
of the Great Divergence. We will not include institutions in our model.
This does not mean we look down upon the eect of institutions; rather,
on one hand, we have not nd a good way to model institutions in our
framework, and on the other hand, we prefer to regard institutions as a
long-run implication of a social culture, and thus crudely subsume them
within `culture'.
Our strategy is to employ a simple two-sector model, based on Stokey
(2001), which compares Eastern and Western economic conditions that
prevailed before the Industrial Revolution, and aims to nd the internal
mechanism that triggered modern growth. First, a benchmark is estab-
lished to model the real conditions of the two economies that were very
1Powelson, John P. (2005), A History of Wealth and Poverty: Why a Few Nations
are Rich and Many Poor, Copyright c  1994 by the University of Michigan. All rights
reserved. First published in the USA by the University of Michigan Press, 1994. Pub-
lished on the World Wide Web by The Quaker Economist with permission from the
University of Michigan Press, 2005.328 KUNTING CHEN
similar initially, i.e., during the 15th century. The second step is to com-
pare the eects of factors in dierent combinations on economic develop-
ment. Some assumptions are made for convenience in a comparison of
these factors. The subsequent step is to model the two dierent evolu-
tions of Eastern-Western economies by two similar models but with very
important dierences in the social and cultural environment.
One challenge for us is to model and measure culture. Considerable re-
search has been undertaken on culture and its eect on long-run economic
development. There is now almost no doubt that the social and cultural
environment has a great eect on individual preferences and, in turn, on
societal choices with regard to political institutions and economic system-
s. However, how culture works and how culture and its eects are to be
measured are still open questions. Existing research usually uses data on
cultural establishments, cultural investments, cultural activities, etc., to
measure culture.2 However, according to the denition of Williams (1998),
\Culture is a state or process of human perfection, in terms of certain
absolute or universal values. The analysis of culture, if such a denition is
accepted, is essentially the discovery and description, in lives and works,
of those values that can be seen to compose a timeless order, or to have
permanent reference to the universal human condition."
Clearly, the existing methods of measurement have not been eective. S-
ince quantitative analysis diers from qualitative analysis, it is possible that
some concrete cultural trait may dier very much between two countries,
and thus have diering, even opposite, eects on economic developmen-
t, while the two countries may yet share the same quantitative cultural
characteristics. Thus, since we are concerned much more about a concrete
cultural trait3 and its eect on the economy, a very special method of
measuring culture is necessary, and we also need to develop a very special
model to study the mechanism of operation of culture.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we establish
our benchmark framework to develop some basic conclusions; the frame-
work is designed to be tractable enough to model the real economies of
England and the Yangzi Delta region during 1400-1850. In the third sec-
tion, we describe the dierent social cultures of East and West and develop
our model to study and explain the process of the Divergence. Then, in
2Jasna Horvat, Sanda Katavi, Martina Mikrut, and Irena Ograjen sek (2003), Con-
ceptualising and Measuring Culture in Surveys: Case Study in the Republic of Croa-
tia, Developments in Applied Statistics, Anu ska Ferligoj and Andrej Mrvar (Editors)
Metodolo ski zvezki, 19, Ljubljana: FDV, 2003.
3Culture as an aggregate concept has many dierent concrete traits, or dierent as-
pects, where each trait can have diering and even opposite eects on economic devel-
opment. Thus, when we carry out research on culture, we are in fact usually concerning
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Section 4, we present evidence that supports our explanation. Finally, we
summarize our conclusions in Section 5.
2. THE MODEL
To begin, we consider two economies both having a system of private
ownership. They are designed to model the real economies of England and
the Yangzi Delta during 1400-1850. This was a time when agriculture and
handicraft industries coexisted for both economies. During this time, the
industries that developed in these two economies were initially very simi-
lar; subsequently, the two economies began to dierentiate. From then on,
England gradually industrialized, while the Yangzi Delta in China devel-
oped increasingly along a labor-intensive path. In fact, at the beginning
of this period, there were almost no dierences between the two economies
except in terms of the cultural environment and social institutions (see Ken
Pomeranz's The Great Divergence). Thus, for the purpose of highlighting
the formative processes that led to the Divergence, we establish models
of the two similar economies with the same parameters excepting that for
the cultural dierence. Then, as the model evolves, this unique parameter
should cause the economies to become quite dierent from each other. In
this way, the factor in question (namely, culture) and its eects will be
prominent.
2.1. The Benchmark Model
In this section, we develop a benchmark model which in the following
section can eectively explain both Western and Eastern economies.
We assume a model in which there are many similar families, each par-
ticipating in both agriculture and industry. The aggregate economic popu-
lation, N, is distributed in two sectors: agricultural labor, Na, and manu-
facturing (industrial) labor, Nm. We dene na and nm as the labor shares
of the respective sectors. Then, we have:
na + nm = 1: (1)
Agricultural Production. For the agricultural sector, we include the
input factors of (i) the land per capita, la  La=N, where La is the aggre-
gate land available in the economy and is assumed xed and (ii) labor with
share na. The per-capita agricultural output is given by Ya in constant-
returns technology. That is,
Ya = B(La)(naN)1 : (2)
In Eq. (2), B represents the general level of societal agricultural technol-
ogy, which is assumed to be the farming production technology. We take330 KUNTING CHEN
the agricultural technological progress to be in phase with the industrial
technological progress, A, as a result of which B=A is always a constant,
. For simplicity, we will assume  = 1 and denote agricultural production
throughout this paper by the adjusted per-capita productivity.
ya = (la)n1 
a (20)
Markets of both agricultural products and labor are assumed to be com-
petitive; thus, the price and wage are given for all agents in the economy.
Since members are free to work in either agriculture or manufacturing, the
two sectors will have an equal wage.
Industrial Production.4 In the manufacturing sector, we model pro-
duction and technological progress by following the approach of Aghion
and Howitt (1992, 1998), which is consistent with the work of Ha (2002).
A single nal output is produced in a competitive market by input factors
that include human capital and a continuum of intermediate products in






In Eq. (3), xi is the output ow of intermediate product i and Ai is the
productivity parameter of intermediate product i. Intermediate products
are produced by innovative monopolistic rms with technologies; thus, xi =
ki=Ai for intermediate product i. The rm's prot is i = pixi rki, where
r is the rental rate of capital and the equilibrium price, pi, of intermediate
good i is just its marginal product, i.e., pi = (nmN)1 Aix
 1
i . The
maximized ow of prot is given as i = (1 )(nmh)1 Aix
i . Dening









4Questions may be raised for this and next section concerning whether our approach
of modeling industrial production by using intermediate production and technology
progress by R&D innovation is reasonable for a historical period, namely, the 15th
century. In response, we argue that initially there was undoubtedly a very low level of
industrialization in both Europe and China, and almost no pure R&D occurred. How-
ever, that does not mean we should not use a model that is suitable for studying modern
economic development and the mechanism of technological progress to study and discov-
er why the Industrial Revolution did not happen before the 18th century. Second, if we
want to know why technological development was so slow at that time and then rather
abruptly began to grow at a rapid pace, we need to know what conditions were not met
initially and what happened subsequently. However, an agricultural economic model
may never yield us the right answer. Thirdly, from the viewpoint of unied theory, we
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At equilibrium, all intermediate rms produce equal amounts of product,
x. Then, we obtain:
r = 2(K=AnmN) 1: (4)
The prot and the aggregate production function are now simply
Q
m =
(1 )K(AnmN)1  and Ym = (nmN)1  R 1
0 Aix
i di = K(AnmN)1 
or, in per-capita productivity-adjusted notation,
m = (1   )k(nm)1  and ym = k(nm)1 : (5)
Innovation. The intermediate producer has the motivation to innovate
for increasing productivity. Innovations follow a Poisson process with an
arrival rate of n; so, the growth rate of A is _ A=A = n  g, where 
is the productivity parameter for R&D, n is the research intensity that is
adjusted by the productivity level, viz., the ratio of the R&D expenditure,
G, to A.
The value of an innovation is determined by the asset pricing equation:
rV = m   nV: (6)
In Eq. (6), V is the value of the innovation. This implies that the expected
income of the innovation, rV , is equal to the prot ow of an intermediate
production under the new technology less the expected loss of capital when
the monopolist is replaced by the next innovator with a probability of n.





Following the approach of Howitt (1999, 2000), the optimal level of R&D
is determined by the arbitrage condition, namely, the marginal cost of
an extra unit of R&D equals the marginal expected benet. If research
expenditures are subsidized at a proportional rate, 	, the marginal cost
of raising the research intensity by one unit is d(1   	)G=dn = (1   	)A,
whereas the marginal expected benet is V . Thus, we have:




where ~  = =A. By ruling out negative R&D, we obtain the following from
Eqs. (4), (5), and (8).
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Eq. (9) shows there is a threshold level k < ~ k, where ~ k = (1 	)=[(1 
)], below which no R&D takes place. Thus, we have our rst proposition.
Proposition 1. R&D takes place only when k > ~ k.5
Trade. Agricultural products are assumed to be perishable and a surplus
is undesirable. In the case of insucient supply, additional quantities can
be obtained by trading industrial product. (On the eve of the Industrial
Revolution, a high population density created heavy survival pressures,
which are regarded as the initial force behind the development of industry.)
The per-capita farming consumption and the importation of farming
produce are dened to be ca and ia, respectively, and are related to the
farming production dened above by:
ca = ya + ia: (10)
Following the argument of Stokey (2002), trade is assumed to be welfare-
increasing at the margin. This means that foreign products may be cheaper
than the same goods that are produced at home; thus, it costs less to
export products in exchange for imports. For simplicity, we continue using
Stokey's method and assume throughout this paper that there is a xed
parameter,  2 [0;1], where
xm = (1   )ia: (11)
Preference. We further assume there is an innite-lived representative
family or individual in the model economies, which always seeks to optimize
its number of children as in Galor (2002, 2004) and Lucas (1998). However,
in our model, we can optimize the population growth-rate instead of the
number of children. This makes no essential dierence in actual fact. For
simplicity, and also given that the population growth-rate does not change
signicantly except over long periods of time, for this parameter we will
rst use a xed value that corresponds to the actual population growth-rate
during 1400-1850, and then we will relax this constraint as necessary.
One important dierence in our treatment of the Divergence problem is
that we include the physical capital in our preference function. This idea
is not new in actual fact. Recently, Cole et al. (1992), Bakshi and Chen
(1996), and Zou (1994, 1995, and 1998) and many others have applied this
idea to various questions. It reects the thought of Max Weber (1958):
individuals accumulate wealth not only for consumption, but also for its
own sake. Here, we employ the technique to convey the spirit of capitalism
or mercantilism (we will further discuss in Section 3). Thus, we dene the
5This is a part of Proposition 1 in Ha (2002).ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 333
preference function as u(ca;cm;k). This denition means that all three
factors, i.e., farming consumption, ca, industrial consumption, cm, and
physical capital, k, inuence individual preferences. Furthermore, another
key feature of the preference function that we want to capture follows
Stokey (2002): individuals consume only agricultural goods up to a certain
consumption threshold, ~ ca; hence, at low levels of income nothing but food
is consumed. In particular, we assume the utility function,
u(ca;cm;k) =

ca   ~ ca; if ca < ~ ca
lnca + T1 lncm + T2 lnk; if ca  ~ ca
(12)
where T1 is the rate of marginal utility between industrial and farming con-
sumption and reects the strength of the individual's preference for luxury,
while T2 is the rate of marginal utility between capital and consumption
and reects the strength of the society's mercantilism (or in Weber's words,
the capitalist spirit).
Budget constraint. The household meets an international budget con-
straint,
_ k = y   xm + ia   ( +  + g)k   cm   ca   g=; (13)
where the aggregate income, y = rk+wnm+m+wna+rlla, is composed of
the saving income, rk, the labor income, w(na +nm), the industrial prot,
m, and the land rent income, rlla, for the rent, rl. The depreciation
rate of physical capital is ; is the population growth-rate, and xm is
the industrial production that is used to trade for the farmed quantity of
product, ia. As per the earlier denition, g= = n denotes the physical
assets used in R&D.
Agricultural production has been assumed to be entirely competitive,
which implies that both land and labor attain their marginal products.
That is, rl = l 1
a n1 
a ;w = (1   )l
an 
a , and ya = rlla + wna. By Eqs.
(10-13), we obtain:
_ k = rk+m+w(1 na)+(1 )rlla (++g)k cm (1 )ca g=: (14)
2.2. Dynamic Optimization of the Household
Household behavior in the economy is divided into two parts: to work and
to consume and invest. We consider them as two independent activities.
For the former, the family needs to decide how much labor to put into
agricultural production and how much into manufacturing. As we have
discussed above, the choice makes the wages between the two sectors equal,
which implies:
w = (1   )l
an 
a = (1   )kn 
m : (15)334 KUNTING CHEN
The relationship determines the share of labor in agriculture and manu-
facturing for a given land and capital accumulation. For the latter part of
the household's decision, the family needs to choose consumption and sav-
ings to maximize its dynastic utility, subject to a budget constraint. The




subject to Eq. (13) and the initial conditions. However, we are interested
in only the phase where ca  ~ ca; this is also in line with Stokey's approach.





e t(lnca + T1 lncm + T2 lnk)dt
subject to
_ k = rk+m+w(1 na)+(1 )rlla (++g)k cm (1 )ca g= (140)
Optimal conditions. It is easy to derive the following conditions.
c 1
a   (1   )1 = 0: (16)
T1c 1
m   1 = 0: (17)
_  =  T2k 1 + 1(   r + ( +  + g)): (18)
In the above, 1 is the Hamiltonian multiplier. From Eqs. (16)-(18), we
get the following Euler equation,
_ cm
cm


















From Eqs. (16-17), we get:
cm = (1   )T1ca: (21)
From Eq. (14') and the facts that ym = rk+m+wnm and ya = rlla+wna,
we get:
_ k = kn1 
m   ( +  + g)k   cm   g= + (1   )(ya   ca): (22)ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 335
















Noting that nm = 1   na and la  l0e (+g)t imply _ nm















+  + g = 0: (24)
Steady state equilibrium. The dynamics of the basic model are de-
scribed by Eqs. (19'), (21) and (23). At steady state, the variables are











m   ( +  + g)k   cm   g= + (1   )(ya   ca) (26)
 + g = 0: (27)






(1   na)  k(la;na): (28)










[ +    r(la;na)]k(la;na): (29)
In Eq. (28), r(la;na)  2( 1 na
k(la;na))1 .
Then, by combining Eqs. (27) and (28) with Eq. (25), we obtain the
following equation that is expressed in na.
0 = k(la;na)(1   na)1    ( +  + g)k(la;na) (30)
  cm(la;na)   g= + (1   )(ya(la;na)   ca(la;na)):
At steady state, since  + g is zero, Eq. (26) implies that la is constant;
thus, by Eq. (29), na is also constant. Then, the steady-state capital,336 KUNTING CHEN
FIG. 1. Traditional Ramsey Equilibrium with T2 = 0
k, manufacturing consumption, c
m, and agricultural consumption, c
a, are
given by Eqs. (27), (28), and (20), respectively. At last, from Eq. (9), we













From Proposition 1 and Eq. (26), we have:
Proposition 2. g =

> 0 when k > ~ k
= 0 when k  ~ k
, while  =

< 0 when k > ~ k
= 0 when k  ~ k
.
This proposition says that when capital accumulation is comparatively
low, technological progress and population growth are almost zero. This is
a very good explanation of a Malthusian economy. When capital accumu-
lation reaches a comparatively high level, technological progress advances;
however, population growth is reduced. This corresponds exactly to what
happened in Western economies during the second phase of the Industrial
Revolution.
Dynamic Analysis of the Basic Model. First, we consider the case
where the division of labor between manufacturing and agriculture is xed.
When T2 = 0, Eq. (19') reduces to the optimal savings equation of the
Ramsey model. The dynamics of the system are roughly shown in Figure 1,
where we plot consumption vs. capital. The vertical line, L2, is where _ c =
0. For the thick curved line, L1, _ k = 0. E0 is the Ramsey equilibrium, which
is stable in the long run. Any shocks, such as an increase in consumption
demand, capital accumulation, a natural disaster, etc., will have only an
eect on the level, but no long-term eect on growth. Some shocks may
put L2 to the right, thereby increasing the equilibrium level of capital
accumulation but no shock can move L2 past the golden-rule point. ThisANALYSIS OF THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 337
is commonly discussed in textbooks and we assume it is familiar to the
reader.
In comparison, when T2 6= 0, the consumption-balance line, _ c = 0, be-
comes a parabola, which is shown by the dotted line in Figure 2. This
gure also shows that the new equilibrium, E3, jumps from k to k.
As before, the horizontal axis denotes the capital, the vertical axis de-
notes the consumption, and the solid upright line is the original line, L2,
from Figure 1. The solid curved line is again _ k = 0, and E0 is the original
Ramsey equilibrium. The equilibrium, E3, is greatly dierent from the
Ramsey equilibrium in that the equilibrium level of capital accumulation
has now jumped past the golden-rule point.
FIG. 2. Equilibrium in our model with T2 6= 0
Let us now examine this dierence through a more formal approach.
From Eqs. (15) and (24)|(26) and by assuming ca = ~ ca, we get:
kn1 
m = s1k + s2: (32)
In Eq. (31), s1 
(+)+T2=T1
2+T2=T1 , and s2 
T2=T1
2+T2=T1[g= + (1   )(~ ca   ya)].
Equation (31) implies that for any specic na and nm, the equilibrium
level of capital is determined by two functions, q = kn1 
m and q = s1k+s2.
These are shown in Figure 3 by l3 and l1, respectively, and there are two
equilibrium points, e1 and e2, which correspond to the two levels of capital,
k1 and k2. While e1 is not stable, e2 is stable.














T1[g=+(1 )(~ ca ya)] > 0. The above relationships
imply that when T)2 is increased, b1 in Figure 3 rises to b2, while the slope338 KUNTING CHEN
FIG. 3. The eect of T2 on equilibrium
of the line l1 increases to that of the line l2. From the gure, it can be seen
that both equilibrium levels of capital are increased but the higher level
increases more.
All the above taken together imply that an economy with an initial cap-
ital level that is greater than the low equilibrium point will converge to a
higher equilibrium, while one with an initial capital that is below the low
equilibrium point increasingly approaches the zero-capital-accumulation e-
quilibrium. The stronger the accumulation of the capitalist spirit in the
economy is, the higher the level of capital at the nontrivial equilibrium will
be.
Rigorously, we establish the following result, the proof of which is given
in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. When the initial equilibrium level of capital is com-
paratively low, i.e., k < ~ k, if the labor cost of agricultural production














T2 > 0; otherwise, dk

T2  0.
Proposition 3 states that when the existing level of capital is compara-
tively low, the stronger the capitalist spirit in a country, the greater willANALYSIS OF THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 339
be its equilibrium level of capital, as long as the marginal product of agri-
cultural labor is suciently high.
Now, we consider the case when the labor distribution is not xed. This
means we now must consider the dynamic contribution of Eq. (23) to the
system. From the analysis above, we see there are always two equilibria:
one high and the other low. The problem is how to transition from the
low equilibrium to the high equilibrium. Eq. (23) implies that if each
term in the left is non-negative, then the only possible solution is a trivial
one. Thus, to achieve growth in capital (or productivity), it is necessary
for at least one other term to be negative. Then, the population decrease
might be one possible explanation for the modern growth that results from
war or natural disasters, for example, but it cannot generate a suciently
negative term. The only remaining possibility is a decrease in the share of
agricultural labor. This is consistent with the conclusions of Proposition
3. The implication is that industrialization pushes an economy toward a
high equilibrium, while agricultural-based economies converge to the low
equilibrium. We will further discuss the details of the development from a
Malthusian state to a stage of modern growth in the following sections.
The model is developed to be tractable enough to give prominence to
cultural and systemic dierences in the real economic conditions of Britain
and China during the period of interest. In next section, we will introduce
dierent cultural environments to the two economies and analyze their
respective evolutions. Then, we will also t the basic model to Eastern and
Western economies in section 3.
3. THE GREAT DIVERGENCE
The basic model we have developed in the last section does not directly
match either of the two economies. In this section, we will focus on the
dierences between them and modify the basic model to t each of them.
3.1. Dierences between East and West and Assumptions
Before the Renaissance, people in both Europe and China lived in a so-
ciety that conformed to the feudal structure of the Middle Ages, where
land belonged to the nobles in Europe (landholders in China). Peasants
rented the land from the nobles (or landholders), and worked from sunrise
to sundown but even the nobles (or landholders) had few creature com-
forts. However, during and after the Renaissance, several dierences arose
between East and West.
To be clear about how the dierences transpired, we need to rst learn
the process and details of the Renaissance and its eect in Europe.
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In the late Middle Ages, the town populations increased in Europe be-
cause of the threat to country farmers of invasion from barbarians; people
left the country for towns and cities so that they could engage in more
protable pursuits.6 According to Smith's theory, social division and large,
assembled, living populations are two main important preconditions for the
development of capitalism. Thus, the accumulation of city populations was
necessary for initial capitalistic economic development. However, one bar-
rier to the assembled living of humans was the plague. In the 14th century,
plague devastated one half of the population of Europe. For a long time,
plague's threat lingered over Europe. However, the terrible \Black Death"
taught the Europeans the importance of healthy and enlightened living
styles. An important consequence of the scourge was that the shackle of
religion was shaken to its very core.
The reason is that in the late 15th century, when the plague abated, pop-
ulations swelled and trade and the economy prospered once again, which
resulted in the formation of a new middle class. The new middle class had
new interests, new ideas, and new lifestyles. As a result, humanist ideas
recovered. Then, the printing press invented by Gutenberg (in 1445) to-
gether with reforms in literary language further advanced the development
of humanism, which resulted in changes in each aspect of culture in Europe.
The cultural changes in Europe during the Renaissance were universal.
Aside from changes in painting, music, and architecture that are usual-
ly introduced,7 one more important aspect arose that can be claried by
an example. On October 31, 1517, a German churchman named Martin
Luther changed Christianity, which included the church's practice of selling
indulgences (people could pay for reducing the time for prayer) and \saying
in the native language instead of in Latin so that the church's teachings
would be more accessible to the people". This reform ignited the Protestant
Reformation. Many people believed the church needed to change. Several
new Christian religions were established. According to The Renaissance,8
\The secular humanist idea held that the church should not rule civic
matters, but should guide only spiritual matters. The church disdained
the accumulation of wealth and worldly goods, supported a strong but lim-
ited education, and believed that moral and ethical behavior was dictated
by scripture. Humanists, however, believed that wealth enabled them to
do ne, noble deeds, that good citizens needed a good, well-rounded educa-
6http://www.learner.org/interactives/renaissance/middleages.html [Oct,12, 2008].
7More information can be found in Wilkins and Hartt (1994).
8http://www.learner.org/interactives/renaissance/printing sub.html [Oct,13, 2008].ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 341
tion (such as that advocated by the Greeks and Romans), and that moral
and ethical issues were related more to secular society than to spiritual
concerns."
The eect of the Protestant Reformation was signicant. First, according
to the spirit of Protestantism, Protestants did not need to see the gaining
of prot as a sin but instead had to feel happy in working hard to glorify
God. As a result, business boomed in Protestant regions; on the contrary,
it declined in Papist regions (Duan, 1994, pp. 91-94). Thus, from then on,
the most inuential lesson from European culture, `The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism' | to quote the title of Weber's classic study
| was increasingly advanced. Second, the Protestant Reformation greatly
reduced the eect of the Holy See, limited the monarch's power, and in turn,
advanced developments in democratic policies and individualism. After all,
the Protestant Reformation encouraged free thinking and motivated new
ideas and scientic research. Schools were built and thus laid the basis for
Europe to increasingly achieve educational and scientic progress. As a
result, Europe made a great contribution in scientic progress during the
17th century. Many luminaries came into prominence at that time, such as
Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, John Locke, Isaac Newton,
Blaise Pascal, and Pierre de Fermat. Thus, it is said that the 17th century
was a time of talent or a time for scientic revolution.
In sum, the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation laid the foun-
dation for early mercantilism in Europe, ignited the scientic revolution
in the 17th century, and also produced a great eect on politics, society,
economy, literature, art, etc. In turn, these together paved the way for
Europe's adoption of the industrial revolution.
3.1.2. China during the Ming dynasty
The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) in China is a time that closely corre-
sponds to the European Renaissance. Feudal monarchy was intensied in
the initial Ming era by the Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang. Born into a farming
family, the emperor `attached importance to farming and repressed com-
merce' and pushed a `ban-sea' policy to avoid the intrusion of seafarers.
This blocked the development of business to some extent, which formed an
obvious contrast to the rise of mercantilism (or `the Spirit of Capitalism'
in Weber's words) in Europe.
Policies in China's history were not stable, at least not in the Ming era.
During about 2130 years from 221 BC, which marked the onset of the Qin
dynasty, to 1911 A.D, which marked the end of the last empire (which342 KUNTING CHEN
belonged to the Manchu or Qing dynasty), 331 reigns transpired, where-
in each emperor's reign lasted 6.4 years on average. Each emperor could
decide policies in accordance with his preferences; thus, the continuity of
policy was very low in old feudal China. This situation was comparatively
much better during the Ming era. In all, 17 reigns lasted during the Ming
era. On average, each emperor held power for about 16 years. Howev-
er, after the rst two years, the position of emperor changed hands very
frequency; the shortest reign lasted only one month.
The institutional and cultural environments in the Ming era were not
benecial to the freedom of expression, individualism, humanism, mercan-
tilism, or the scientic spirit. Firstly, political systems, especially during
the early Ming era, were extremely harsh and increasingly corrupt, becom-
ing ineective at the close. The rst emperor, Zhu Yuanzhang, was called a
killer by some people because too many people were killed during his time,
including even generals, who followed him, and his kin. Sometimes, all
the residents in a whole street were killed although only one resident had
committed an oence. As a result, no one had the courage to express dis-
senting opinions. In such an extensively autocratic society, humanity was
completely disregarded and individualism was totally suppressed. This sit-
uation had such a lasting eect on the people that during the Sheng Zong
reign, wherein the emperor was infatuated with Taoism and did not as-
sume his position for two decades, the country's administrative machinery
still worked well. One Ming emperor, Zhu Youxiao, was good at carpentry
while another, Wu Zong, worked even in the restaurant business and the
pork trade. Why did the populace not pull down the useless empires? A
partial explanation is that freedom of thought and civil liberties had long
been denied, as a result of which ideas did not emerge. A deeper reason
lies in the culture.
Traditional Chinese culture that was based on Confucianism, Buddhism,
and Taoism taught people ethical guidelines such as \the three cardinal
guides and the ve constant virtues",9 \the three forms of obedience and
the four virtues"10, which prescribed that the people should absolutely
obey, submit, and stick to the empire. As a result, people usually believed
that to ght against either the empire or government ocers was the great-
9The three cardinal guides: ruler guides subject; father guides son; and husband
guides wife. The ve constant virtues: benevolence; righteousness; propriety; wisdom;
and delity.
10The three forms of obedience: to father before marriage; to husband after marriage;
and to son after the death of the husband. The four virtues: morality; proper speech;
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est outrage and the worst oence. Thus, in such a cultural environment,
individualism and a liberal spirit had no place; however, they constitute
the most important base for producing innovation and scientic thought.
Other important lessons from Eastern traditional culture may be \the
three religions and the nine academic schools",11 and \the preservation of
family lineage from generation to generation".12 The former says that in
ancient China, the rst choice was for a son to become a sage, while to
become, literally, an articer or a businessman was usually considered the
least desirable. This directly illustrates that the mercantile spirit was weak
in traditional China and mirrors the tenet that prevailed in Europe prior
to the Protestant Reformation. This explains why traditional Chinese did
not attach as much importance to capital accumulation. Sons guaranteed
their parents' well-being in their old age. The wide-spread mercantilism
that arose in Europe in the 19th century was in direct contrast to these
Eastern values.
Actually, during the middle of the Ming era, especially during the reign of
Zhu Di, policies were a little relaxed and culture and the economy obtained
a chance to develop. This can be shown by two examples. The rst is that
of Zheng He, a famous seafarer in Chinese history, who had navigated
seven times to the Atlantic. Another is that the Y ongl e Encyclopedia was
commissioned by Emperor Yongle of the Chinese Ming dynasty in 1403.
It is believed to be the world's largest known general encyclopedia, and
one of the earliest. However, because the socio-cultural environment in
the Ming era was not benecial enough to innovation, scientic progress,
and business development as in Europe, a gap between China and Europe
in the fundamental reformation of societal institutions, scientic progress,
and business development increasingly formed in the 17th century. The
result was that by the end of the 17th century, Europe had nished the
necessary preparation for entrance into the modern industrial revolution in
every aspect, while China was still wandering in an obsolete, feudal cultural
environment.
In summary, we believe that the initial dierence in social culture (the
Reformation in European culture was ignited by the Renaissance and the
11According to ancient tradition in China, people were divided into dierent classes
according to their statuses and occupations. The three main religions were Confucianis-
m, Buddhism, and Taoism. The nine academic schools usually ranked nine occupations
in the following order: monarch; sage; hermit; government ocial; scholar; warrior;
farmer; worker; and, lastly, the merchant.
12Many Chinese people even now believe the preservation of family lineage from gen-
eration to generation is very important. As a result, even today, people usually prefer
to have boys than girls.344 KUNTING CHEN
Protestant Reformation) resulted in early dierences in several aspects:
mercantilism; the scientic spirit; individualism; and humanism (which
worked as bases on motivating institutional innovation toward the direc-
tion of modern and equal.) In turn, these dierences developed increasingly
into an obvious gap between the two regions in terms of the economy, pol-
itics, and the level of technological progress. At last, the Great Divergence
transpired. In the next section, we will model the process to make clear
the function in the process of each factor: the culture; the New World (to
verify Pomeranz's conjecture); trade (Galor's theory); and technological
progress (supported by many scholars).
3.2. Fundamental Assumptions of the Model
For convenience of exposition and for clarifying the questions, we need
to make several fundamental assumptions before establishing our model.
Of course, there were several other cultural dierences between East and
West. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss each of them
in detail. Instead, we focus only on societal preferences for mercantilism,
culture, trade (the New World), and technological process. First, we will
assume that the dierence in the preference for mercantilism between Eng-
land and China was large enough. Then, we check what might happen in
our model.
Assumption 1. Western culture was more benecial to mercantilism
than Eastern culture.
Or directly,
Assumption 1': Western economies had a stronger capitalist spirit than
Eastern economies, i.e., Tw
2 > Te
2.
Now we introduce the second assumption. According to Pomeranz (2001),
the two regions were similar in terms of economic development around 1400
BC.13 For convenience in comparison and for making clear the internal
mechanism of the subsequent divergence between the two economies, we
will assume that initially there were two equal economies and both initially
had comparatively lower levels of capital accumulation.
Assumption 2. The two economies had equal and very low levels of
initial capital, i.e., kw
0 = ke
0 = k0 < ~ k.
13Pomeranz reported that the consumption of some luxuries, such as tea and sugar,
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Pomeranz's study further suggests the indispensable importance of the
New World's contribution to England's break from the Malthusian stage
towards the stage of the modern industrial revolution. By and large, we
believe this assertion of Pomeranz is correct. However, we are still not clear
about how the outside conditions worked and to what extent they were
important in the progress of humankind. For modeling the contribution
in the process of industrialization in England, the following condition is a
crux.
Condition 1: The New World, as a sudden and immense source of new
productive land, helped England's economy satisfy condition (33) on the
real wage.
All other conditions of the two economies are assumed to be the same as
described by the basic model. Thus, the only dierence between the two
economies was that in assumptions 1 and 2 and condition 1. In the next
section, we will describe the evolution of the Great Divergence on the basis
of the above criteria.
3.3. The Great Divergence
Having laid the above foundation, in this section, we explain by our mod-
el the process of the occurrence and development of the Great Divergence
between England and the Yangzi delta during 1400-1850. We treat the
process in two steps: (i) the original capital accumulation (OCA) stage
and (ii) the modern growth (MG) stage.
The OCA stage (before 19th century). Initially, at this stage,
according to Assumption 2, the original level of capital was low in both
economies. Thus, by Proposition 1 in subsection 3.1, there was initially
no signicant technological progress in either economy. This is in fact the
same as the real case of technological development in the long course of
human history prior to the Industrial Revolution during which both tech-
nological progress and productivity developed very slowly. This situation
was unchanged until the end of the 18th century (see Figure 5).
The case of a near-zero rate of technological progress is trivial in our
model. As shown in Figure 1, the economy remained at a stable level.
This was precisely the case of a Malthusian economy in human history.
During this stage, growth rates of production were very low because of
the low levels of capital and near-zero technological progress, which, in turn,
implied a low population growth-rate. Humankind had spent a long time
in this economic state, and the economic thinking that prevailed before
the Industrial Revolution held this state to be an everlasting phenomenon.
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Incidental events that triggered change. Two events happened in
Europe in the 16th century that were signicant for the advancement of
humankind. One was the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation as
we discussed in subsection 3.1.1, which had a great eect on developments
in the economy, culture, politics, art, humanities, etc., and, in turn, paved
the way for the scientic revolution in the 17th century in Europe. This
led to Europe's adoption of the industrial revolution in the 18th and 19th
centuries. The other event was the discovery of the New World. These
were two independent, coincidental events but a great change occurred
as a result of their conjunction. The former event is usually believed to
have motivated the capitalist spirit, while the latter event, according to
Condition 1, allowed condition (33) to be met. Vide Proposition 2, the
capitalist spirit, in turn, had a positive eect on capital accumulation.
This made it possible for England to accumulate higher degrees of capital.
Divergence that occurred during the MG stage. Now, we con-
sider the dierences between the English and Yangzi Delta economies. As
a result of Assumption 1', the capitalist spirit was stronger in Western e-
conomies than in Eastern economies, and by Proposition 2, the society that
was the rst to meet condition (33) would be the rst to achieve a high-
er level of capital accumulation. If neither economy could meet condition
(33), neither should have evolved beyond the Malthusian stage in which
they had remained throughout the course of history. If condition (33) was
met by both economies, because England had a stronger capitalist spirit,
England should have attained a greater equilibrium capital accumulation,
and in turn, its level of capital should have been rst to exceed the thresh-
old level, , which was necessary for embarking upon modern growth. Thus,
we have our rst corollary.
Corollary 1. With only the dierence in Assumption 1' (all other con-
ditions being equal), the Yangzi delta would never attain the MG stage be-
fore England.
What remains to be claried is how (33) could be met. Actually, there
are two ways. From the denition of wa, one is a decrease in the share of
agricultural labor, na, and the other is an increase in the per-capita land.
Both can increase the marginal product of agricultural labor. The former
is reasonable and easily understood. As we all know, every country, when
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transition from the agricultural to the industrial sectors14. With regard
to the latter, when the New World was discovered and integrated with
England's economy, the population density in England was reduced, and,
the real eective per-capita land increased. In turn, the marginal product
of labor in the agricultural sector became larger, which further enhanced
the capitalist spirit and capital accumulation in England.
From the last section, we know that the development by an economy
of a high equilibrium depends on whether its initial level of capital, k0, is
greater than k1, as shown in Figure 3. If k0 is less than k1, the economy
converges to the zero equilibrium. Without the New World, if the English
economy had developed through the natural growth of both population
and technological progress, it is unlikely that its eective per-capita level
of capital would have exceeded k1. Even if some positive productivity shock
had occurred before England had accumulated enough capital, the level of
capital might have easily returned to zero. However, with the inuence
of the New World, a sudden and great increase in the available land and
natural resources made it possible for England to accumulate considerable
capital in a short span of time. It is reasonable to assume that in that
process, the amount of capital would have surpassed k1.
Without a strong capitalist spirit, even with the help of the New World,
the model economy would still remain a Malthusian economy. On the other
hand, we have shown above that with only a strong capitalist spirit, it was
also impossible for an economy to escape from the Malthusian state. By
combining these observations together, we deduce the following.
Corollary 2. Both the capitalist spirit and the New World were neces-
sary but not individually sucient for achieving modern growth. However,
when combined, they were both necessary and sucient.
From the above, we know that England accumulated its capital to a
level that was high enough for attaining modern growth, partly because
of outside conditions and partly because of internal factors (its social and
cultural environment). The Yangzi Delta would not have accumulated
enough capital even with the help of outside conditions such as the New
World, because its special social culture did not encourage a capitalist
spirit.
14For example, in China, when the policy was relaxed in allowing labor liquidity in
1990, a huge labor transition occurred, and in turn, a sustainable stage of rapid growth
beginning from then on has already been ongoing for nearly two decades.348 KUNTING CHEN
The Modern Growth Stage. The main feature of the modern growth
stage is that the growth rates of production, population, and technological
progress are obviously larger than zero. According to Proposition 1, only
when capital accumulation is more than ~ k can the growth rate of techno-
logical progress exceed zero. In the last section, we showed it was possible
for England to accumulate a high level of capital. When its capital was
high enough, its technological level began to grow at a positive rate.
According to Galor's development,15 early in industrialization, physical
capital is the only engine that drives growth, whereas, at later stages, either
technological progress and/or human capital dominates. This is because at
later times, technological progress and the accumulation of human capital
begin to be cost-eective, whereas in the earlier periods, they are not. Many
other papers have claried how technological progress works in driving the
modern growth process. From all of them, it is clear that technological
progress is the main force behind modern industrial growth. Thus, we will
not pursue this direction any further. Instead, we will turn now to focus
on trade's contribution.
3.4. Trade
This section considers the eect of international trade on modern growth.
From Eq. (10), ia = ca ya denotes the food that an economy must import.




[g=   (1   )ia]; (34)
which implies that an increase in food importation will drive down line l1
to line l3, as shown in the following gure, viz., Figure 4. This, in turn,
implies an increase in the high equilibrium level of capital accumulation
for industrialized countries and a decrease in the already low equilibrium
of agricultural-based regions.
We claim that trade has thus helped to enlarge the gap between indus-
trial and agricultural economies. Trade has a two-sided eect. While trade
further advances the development of advanced industrialized countries, it
also thwarts industrialized development in underdeveloped countries and
consigns these countries to progressively poorer labor-intensive economies.
15Galor and Moav (2004) and Galor (2005) believe that in the early stages of in-
dustrialization, physical capital accumulation is a primary source of economic growth.
In the later stages of development, the return on human capital increases due to the
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FIG. 4. Trade's eect on equilibrium
This conclusion is consistent with general theories of trade16; authors be-
lieve that international trade was important in initially promoting indus-
trialized development in England. This also gives a better understanding
of why the Qing (or Manchu) dynasty in China (which followed the Ming
dynasty) had even attempted to carry out a closed-economy policy, but
was thwarted by the Eight-Countries' Fire; perhaps, the Qing government
had already been convinced of its bad eect, and naively sought to avoid it.
Anyway, the real data in Table 1 clearly show that the levels of industrial-
ization in countries such as China and India progressively worsened during
the Industrial Revolution, while Western countries progressively advanced.
We can better understand trade by asking whether it is necessary for
modern growth. Further, how much did this trade contribute to the Great
Divergence? To focus on this kind of question, we consider in more detail
a situation without trade. In this case, as shown by the line l1 in Figure
4, there are still two equilibrium solutions. The one on the right, i.e., the
higher level of capital, is stable, while the one on the left (a lower level
of capital) is not. Thus, there are always two possibilities: to approach
an economy with a stable and higher level of capital or to develop into an
extremely poor state with zero capital. The outcome depends directly on
the economy's initial level of capital, which, in turn, depends on the level
of the economy's marginal product of labor, as we saw earlier.
There is an explanation for the evolution of an economy with a zero
level of capital. Without trade, food can only be supplied by the agricul-
tural production of each economy. Since there is no avenue for exchanging
16For example, the conclusion is consistent with series studies on trade, such as Galor
and Mountford (2006), Stocky (2001), and Romer (2002), in which international trade
shapes the international distribution of labor.350 KUNTING CHEN
industrial production for agricultural product, trade is not present to moti-
vate further industrial development. Without the motivation for industrial
development, there is insucient motivation for technological developmen-
t. With limited arable land, the agricultural production in each economy
can supply only a limited population. We illustrate this in the following
manner.
N "
(1) ) la #
(2) ) na "
(3) ) nm #
(4) ) nm = 0
(5) ) N = ~ N;ca = ~ ca;cm = ym = k = 0:
For an increasing population, N, in the rst step, the per-capita land is
reduced. In step (2), to keep the per-capita consumption of agricultural
product greater than the minimum level, ~ ca, we must increase the agricul-
tural labor share, na, which implies a decrease of the manufacturing labor
share, nm, in step (3). However, as shown in (4), eventually, nm reaches
zero and cannot be reduced further. Thus, the economy remains in a sta-
ble equilibrium in the long run, with the population being around a stable
level, ~ N, the per-capita consumption of agricultural product being ~ ca, and
the per-capita capital, consumption, and industrial production being zero.
This is just a Malthusian economy.
When there is no help from outside sources, the above process explains
a long-term Malthusian economy either with or without trade. However,
when external land and resources are available, the situation is dierent.
An increase in the marginal product of labor in the agricultural sector
results in a surplus of agricultural labor. This implies a reversal of the
arrows in steps (1), (2), and (3) of the above process. When the New World
was discovered by Europe, the cultivated land eectively increased, thereby
engendering just such a rise in the marginal product of labor. Hence, the
manufacturing labor share was driven up and industry ourished. We
see then that a higher equilibrium in terms of the level of capital may
be attained even without trade. Considering these results, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. Trade is a supportive condition, but not a necessary
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without trade and without the New World, the English economy would not
have beaten a path towards modern growth.
We can summarize our result as follows.17
Case 1: Absent a capitalist spirit, none of the steps in the progression to
modern growth can happen.
Case 2: In the presence of a capitalist spirit but without an external
source of land, again, none of the steps will occur.
Case 3: With both a capitalist spirit and an external land-source, an
economy proceeds toward modern growth.
Case 4: With a capitalist spirit, an external land-source, and the addition
of trade, industrializing economies benet while agricultural economies lose.
We can now give a systematic explanation of the process that underlay
the Great Divergence and modern growth.
3.5. A Unied Explanation and Some Evidence
In the early stages of European history (i.e., before the Renaissance),
the economy was in a state where individuals were constrained to only
produce in the agricultural sector. Manufacturing and industry were rel-
atively undeveloped. Most importantly, the cultural environment was not
favorable to innovation, mercantilism, or the spirit of capitalism. As a re-
sult, capital accumulation stayed at a very low level, and the economies
lingered in a long-term stable Malthusian equilibrium.18 During that time,
international trade was also undeveloped. One reasonable explanation for
this is that cost-eective transportation, such as rail and shipping, were all
expensive and depended on high levels of capital accumulation.19 There-
fore, while capital accumulation remained insucient, trade was not very
eective, and in turn, industrial products could not be traded for necessary
agricultural products. A lack of industrial development implied insucient
motivation for signicant industrial technological development. The rate
of technological progress was consequently low; this was also because tech-
nological development did depend on a high level of capital accumulation.
17Here, because technological progress is in fact an intermediate variable but not an
initial cause for modern growth, we have regarded it as one result of modern growth.
18\During a long reign of peace Heaven and Earth could not but propagate the human
race, yet their resources that can be used to the support of mankind are limited.... Both
Ch'ing [Qing] China and Tokugawa Japan ultimately came under this kind of Malthusian
pressure, as did, earlier, England in the Later Middle Ages." Rostow (1973), p. 549.
19\The [lack of] increase in British trade is typical rather than extraordinary until the
take-o in the last twenty years of the century (18) when ...". Rostow (1973), p. 549.352 KUNTING CHEN
(See Figure 5, which illustrates that before 1800, TFP growth in England
was very low.)
FIG. 5. Annual growth rates of the TFP and aggregate capital of England. (Taken
from Voigtlander and Voth, 2006).
With the Renaissance in Europe, circumstances converged. The Euro-
pean Renaissance activated a mercantile and capitalistic spirit in society.
The New World gave England the chance to meet condition (33) (as Fig-
ure 6 shows, the real wage in England greatly increased between 1620 and
1750).
England began to accumulate sucient capital to transition to modern
growth. Its capital accumulation reached a level that was high enough to
establish infrastructures for trade, education, R&D, and many other social
FIG. 6. Fluctuations in the real wage and the underlying trend for England. (Taken
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services. England then achieved positive growth in technological develop-
ment, which enabled production in each sector to become sustainable and
even more ecient. At the same time, trade conditions allowed it to import
food from other countries more cheaply than to produce them domestically,
which motivated further industrial development because industrial produc-
tion was now more cost-eective. Thus, the presence of trade encouraged
early industrial countries to industrialize further, while causing less devel-
oped countries to increasingly turn to agriculture. Figure 7 shows that
there was a notable increase in industrial production that accompanied the
growth of the main agricultural import, cotton. From Table 1, we see that
industrialization in Western countries rose signicantly, while it markedly
decreased in Eastern countries, such as China and India.
FIG. 7. British industrial output and cotton imports, 1700-1913 (1913=100). Taken
from Chapter 6 of Findlay and O'Rourke (2007).
4. RELATED RESEARCH
It has now become a widely accepted fact that cultural factors play
an important role in the economic growth of any country. Many stud-
ies concerning the relationship of culture and economic growth have been
conducted, such as Thompson (2001), Chang (1998), Harrison (1992) and
Hofstede (1997, 2001).
Among the theories prevailing in the literature, for example, one theo-
ry has suggested that two developments in the early modern period were354 KUNTING CHEN
TABLE 1.
Per capita levels of industrialization, 1750-1913. Taken from Chapter
6 of Findlay and O'Rourke (2007).
(U.K. in 1900=100; 1913 boundaries)
Country 1750 1800 1860 1913
Austria-Hungary 7 7 11 32
Belgium 9 10 28 88
France 9 9 20 59
Germany 8 8 15 85
Italy 8 8 10 26
Russia 6 6 8 20
Spain 7 7 11 22
Sweden 7 8 15 67
Switzerland 7 10 26 87
United Kingdom 10 16 64 115
Canada na 5 7 46
United States 4 9 21 126
Japan 7 7 7 20
China 8 6 4 3
India 7 6 3 2
Brazil na na 4 7
Mexico na na 5 7
important to the Great Divergence and that both resulted from the intro-
duction of movable type in Europe. The rst development was the emer-
gence of standardized written versions in vernacular languages that allowed
information to be shared widely at low cost. The second was a series of
revolutions, such as the rise of literacy within European societies, which
shifted these sectors from a non-cooperative to a cooperative equilibrium.
In any case, it is clear that the printing press was a crucial innovation in
Renaissance Europe. However, because of the characteristics of the systems
of writing, the introduction of movable type was less useful and therefore
slower to occur in the regions of Asia. Also, it is believed that the in-
novations that occurred in early Europe | technological, informational,
nancial, philosophical, etc. | were directly based on European cultural
development. There also exists strong empirical evidence that economic de-
velopment is associated with shifts away from absolute, traditional norms
and values towards values that are increasingly rational, tolerant, trust-
ing, and participative (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Bell, 1973; Bell, 1976;
Inglehart, 1988; Inglehart, 1997).ANALYSIS OF THE GREAT DIVERGENCE 355
For Eastern societies as well, many studies demonstrate that the cultural
environment aects economic development. The classical study is Weber's
treatise, Confucianism and Taoism (1951). Weber argues that Confucian-
ism created an environment that was hostile to capitalist development.
Being a rational ethical system, it emphasized `sib' or kinship as the social
relationship of primary importance, and thereby promoted economically
inecient nepotism (Fukuyama, 2001).
One of the most recent studies that model the cultural eect is Kanatas
and Stefanadis (2005). The authors stress that the link between a developed
nancial system and a high rate of economic growth may not be causal:
the two may be driven by a third factor, namely, a country's culture. They
believe culture can be the engine of economic prosperity and growth and a
critical factor in the development of nancial markets.
These theories furnish good support to our basic idea: culture does mat-
ter very much.
With regard to the second related aspect, mercantilism has long been
believed to be signicant to economic growth. For example, early studies by
Schmoller (1897), Krishna (1924), and Heckscher (1935), and recent papers,
such as McDermott (1999), stress the analysis of the eect of monopolistic
rights on modern growth. This paper adds to the body of literature by
adopting a model-based approach.
Thirdly, this paper is also related to the unied endogenous growth the-
ory, as introduced in Section 1. Our work adds to this eld of study inas-
much as we compose and systematically analyze four factors in one unied
endogenous-growth model and develop some implications that are at vari-
ance with extant ndings.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have modeled the process of modern economic growth
and the Great Divergence between Western and Eastern economies. Using
only a simple model and classical economic analysis, we obtain many results
that match general modern economic conclusions. Through a series of
analyses, we conclude the following.
Of course, the development of modern economic systems is a complex
process that involves multiple inuences. We demonstrate that the cultur-
al environment was the most important and fundamental force behind it.
However, social and cultural dierences alone were not sucient to cause
the Great Divergence. Favorable outside circumstances, such as the ex-
ploitation of the New World, were also necessary for modern growth and356 KUNTING CHEN
for nally causing a divergence between countries in accordance with their
social cultures.
Trade is an important supportive condition that enabled Western e-
conomies to enter the modern-growth phase, and at the same time, drove
Eastern economies along an increasingly impoverished, agriculturally-dominant
path.
Although technological progress was, of course, important to modern
growth, in this paper we regarded it as a result or an intermediate eect of
the endogenous-growth process.
We agree that institutions matter much for long-run economic growth.
However, we regard institutions as a product of societal choice that is based
on the unique cultural environment. This treatment of institutions might
be construed as a aw of this paper but we do not have any other good
means of incorporating institutions into our model.
APPENDIX A











(1   na)=na] < 0: (A.1)
Then, by the assumption that k < ~ k and by using Proposition 1, we
know that g = 0. Without technological progress, by Proposition 2, the











m   k   cm + (1   )(ya   ca): (A.3)
Equation (27) can be rewritten as (1   )ym=nm = (1   )ya=na. From
this equation and also through (20), (A.3) becomes:
0 = (1 + ~ t)(
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substituting (27) into (A.6) and using the fact that nm = 1 na, we get an
equation for the share of agricultural labor, na. Dierentiating the equation








































and wa  (1 )( la
na) as before, which is the marginal product of labor in
the agricultural sector or the real wage of agricultural labor. From (A.7), it








, the labor cost of agricultural
production is larger than a xed level and then, dna
dT2 < 0. Together with
(A.1), we have completed the proof.
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